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In the increasingly dispersed and fragmented nature of the Thai (post-) metropolis, and with broad political reform now concentrating on decentralization and stakeholder participation, there is a radical rhizomatic potentiality (in the sense of Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) in new acentered electronic networks that resist normalization and regulation, that are sometimes short-lived and appear anywhere at anytime (see Shields, 1996, p. 6) . 2 Then, following the rhizome metaphor, if each line is ruptured, another interconnected line will simply emerge, often spontaneously, in any given locality. This is a distinctive feature of electronic networks contesting the very ground of established religio-political institutions and the legitimating, normalizing power of the state.
In the complexity of the new urban milieu, material spatial practices and social arrangements have been recoded and are continuing to effect everyday life. The Bud-dhist monasteries, the spiritual heart/center of the community, are now submerged, "lost in space" in the Thai postmetropolis as a consequence of unfettered capitalism concentrated in the urban center since the postwar years. The ritually significant monasteries as community sites once attracted a variety of social activities; now, however, they are part of a depressed, marginal metropolitan landscape-a consequence of unregulated urban growth and inner city decay. These marginal urban sites are places that produce counterhegemonic discourses, expressed in particular social forms and practices. They are lived or representational space (Lefebvre, 1991) or "Thirdspace" (Bhabha, 1991; Soja, 1996) with the potential to radically transform knowledge into action as a means of bringing about desired external changes (Soja, 1996, p. 22) .
The work by sociologist Manuel Castells on the informational society, virtuality, and the "space of flows" (the integrated global network, in "capital, labour, commodities, information and images"; see also Lash & Urry, 1994, p. 12 ) discussed later is also useful to understanding the dynamics of the postmodern urban milieu. The space of flows has reduced the relevance of temporal coordinates, disordering the sequencing of events and making them appear simultaneous. This disorientation of historical place-based practices and, correspondingly, between self and surrounding milieu that Olalquiaga (1992, p. 1) refers to as "psychasthenia" has led to the search for a here-andnow relevance that is captured so imaginatively by recent urban-based social and religious movements.
In this search for contemporary meaning, it is important, then, to move to an analysis of the Internet and its territorializing possibilities implicit in digital Dhamma 3 or simulated Sanghas 4 and new electronic religious sites that are contesting normative sacred space. In this new electronic religion, Webmasters are conceived as the religious specialists or "virtuosi" (in Weber's terms) for giving definitions, taking the place of monks as disseminators of knowledge (secular and sacred). As one DhammaWebmaster said, this scenario is one that questions the "place" (and sanctity) of monks with emergent (disembodied) cyber-monastic communities, a feature of a new postmodern urban Buddhist society. But first, to understand the implications of this clearer, I look at the changing nature of urban spaces in Thailand.
The Thai Postmetropolis
In the Thai postmetropolis, social space is being markedly reconfigured as it becomes transmuted into a virtual "world city" marked only by the presence of real time (Virilio, 1993, p. 72) . In terms of material spatial practices (flows, patterns, movement), the city is no longer a singular, contained site, but rather a mobile place "penetrated by channels of rapid communication" (Virilio, 1986, p. 6) . The city is polycentric and dispersed, though it still conserves a center as there is "no urbanity without a centre" (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 208) . It is primarily a nomadic-like place with numerous Other-or countersites; for instance, the many private universities, contemporary (alternative) art galleries, multiplex shopping centers, unofficial and unregistered Buddhist monasteries, Internet-or cybercafes, private housing estates, and so forth-all situated in a developing exopolis. This spreading, urbanizing process has over the past 50 years consumed more and more of Thailand's rich central delta rice lands. The new metropolis is then "exploding and coalescing" in a multitude of dispersed new communities, "improbable cities where centrality is virtuality ubiquitous and the solid fa- miliarity of what we once knew as urban melts into air" (Soja, 1996, p. 239) . These alternative dispersed sites, in one way or another, contest the legitimacy of the politicoadministrative center, its institutional (civic and military) power, including the educational and politico-juridical state apparatuses. These are the principal loci for the production and reproduction in the far order of institutional (Foucauldian) multiple regimes of truth.
Bangkok is emerging as an important regional economic command site, with a new strategic role in the current world economy. This is due in part to a spatial dispersion involving numerous economic activities and the "telematic global integration" (Sassen, 1999, p. 59) . Although centrality remains an important element of this economic system, as mentioned above the forces of globalization and the new technologies have markedly reworked the "spatial correlates of centrality." Indeed, in reconfiguring centrality (and the place of the city) and related social spatialization, these forces have simultaneously created new spaces for centrality (Sassen, 1999, p. 60) .
Bangkok, as a contemporary urban milieu, and its imagining, has more in common with Disneyland (Kraiyudth, cited in Bello, Cunningham, & Li, 1998, p. 101 ) than a real place. The many new elevated systems may even be a problem in terms of the hierarchy of social orderings, as in the binary oppositional categories high/low that have long dominated much thinking in Thai social life, especially in the configuration of royalty-commoner relations. For example, royalty moving across and below in the new metropolis where "low" commoner traffic on new elevated expressways situated above the head of "high" royalty have to stop as they cannot, even for an instant, be above persons so "high." As Shields (1991, pp. 4-5) notes, high/low oppositions have a geographic parallel in the dualism of central/marginal. Here, the "social definition of marginal places and spaces is intimately linked with the categorisation of objects, practices, ideas and modes of social interaction as belonging to the 'Low culture' . . . the culture of the marginalised." In the not too distant future, Bangkokians will also be travelling underground. It will be interesting to see, in relation to royalty/high culture, how oppositional categories of high/low will be interpreted at this time.
The monasteries, the spiritual heart of the community, were once the most inspiring and grandeur of sites. They are fast losing their place-like Bangkok's once vibrant canal network-in the shadows of time (or a time that is no longer so significant). As the city and its population have grown, indeed doubled between the early 1960s-1980s, so public (green) places, such as they were, have disappeared in an expanse of concrete (the giant Siam Cement Group did well during these years). In terms of material space, an increased population and need for housing and recreation also put pressure on inner-city monasteries. The inspiring Temple of the Golden Mount (mentioned earlier as a landmark in inner Bangkok) can be still seen from a distance but only if travelling on the new three-lane elevated expressways. In contrast, the working heart of the city has gained in symbolic significance, as a site of increasingly globalized finance.
The monasteries, which once attracted a variety of social activities and energies, may also be contrasted with Bangkok's depressed and marginal natural areas (see preliminary work by K. M. Anderson, n.d.) . These are urban landscapes that are neither pristine nor pastoral, such as vacant overgrown lots, road and railway verges, rooftop gardens, grass strips under bridges, and so forth. These places are the consequence of urban growth and inner city decay, and considered problems to be solved by politicians, urban planners, and environmental professionals. Aside from this marginal nature, Bangkok consists of managed and organized nature: the monuments, public parks, the manicured gardens of international hotels, sports and recreational clubs (such as the Royal Bangkok Sports Club)-places for the very rich. These are sites of formally mediated encounters, where the above-mentioned professionals provide access to an officially sanctioned nature.
Marginal nature can also be transformed into sacred sites through the process of place making, as they become liminal urban places (or nonplaces) that are not officially managed or pastoral and neither completely wild. Liminal sites are, as Turner (1969, pp. 108-109) notes, associated with "magico-religious properties." Here, there are to be found a variety of religious objects and social forms including nomadic mystics, roadside shrines, fortune-tellers or seers, special sanctified trees considered the place of locality spirits, honored with garlands of flowers, and places where the occasional wandering monk temporarily encamps. These are simply places for passing through. In a number of marginal sites of nature, there are the ubiquitous sacred Bodhi (Pho or ficus religiosa) trees (the tree under which the Buddha was reputed to have gained enlightenment) where disused spirit houses, shrines, and other sacred objects are left for the elements. This resolves the problem of where to deposit unused sacred objects. In the forest monasteries, Bodhi Trees are also often the sites of disused alms bowls. Most of these are uncertain and potentially dangerous and polluting places where people outwardly display caution and avoid heedlessness.
In general, marginal sites constitute the social periphery and are places that produce counterhegemonic discourses, expressed in particular social forms and practices (as in the "habits of being and the way one lives"; see bell hooks in Soja, 1996, p. 98) .
It offers an open perspective to new ways of seeing, creating, and imagining alternatives, utopias, and new worlds. 5 Aside from sacred things and persons, Bangkok's marginal space includes organized street beggars and other social elements of an informal sector of the economy.
The urban streets then are localizable, incongruous nonplaces or heterotopias (Foucault, 1986, p. 24) in the sense that they are disordered spaces with a large number of arranged orders or sites that somehow interconnect at certain points. At the same time, the street also has its own hierarchical order that is a microcosm of the far order, indeed the whole cosmic order. This includes the locality shrines and other sacred sites inscribed with varieties of local history, monks, street vendors, government officials, police, the street kids, and so forth. As actualized heterotopic sites, marginal nature as other space may have much in common with the invisible and spontaneous electronic networks-or cyberspace (see also Young, 1998) , which I discuss later. These are (post-) modernity's nomadic spaces, appropriated so imaginatively by alternative religious movements. As Other, differentiated social arrangements, these movements and certain charismatic individuals are situated at the intersection of civil society (situated between the state and individuals)-a growing feature of democratization.
The Virtual Present
Manuel Castells has looked at the dislocation or disjunction and its effects on the individual and social relations in cities (see also Robins, 1993) , which has helped us to understand the nature of new social or civil society movements/organizations and related spatial arrangements. He argues that, essentially, the postindustrial or new societies consist of various forms and sequences of interaction and exchange, in an inte-grated and networked space of flows. These exchanges are undertaken through institutional and organizational networks (Castells, 1996a, p. 29) that are not necessarily located in cities but everywhere in interaction with physical space. It is an expression of the dominant social logic found in the new Informational or Network Society, which in turn is formed by the "real virtuality" of the space of flows. 6 As a period of so-called posthistoricism, the space of flows dissolves time through disordering the "sequences of events and making them simultaneous" (Castells, 1996b, p. 467) . In terms of (post-) modern Buddhist thinking, this has resonances of Auerbach's (cited in B. Anderson, 1991, p. 24 ) sacred communities where the "here and now" (as in a contemporary "Buddhism of the here-and-now"; see Natayada, 1994, p. 117) becomes "simultaneously something which has always been, and will be fulfilled in the future." The reformist soteriological interpretation of Nibbana is conceived then as a momentary, here and now mental experience, rather than a metaphysical entity (Jackson, 1989, p. 48) . 7 In the dissolution of time, cultural forms no longer exist in succession, but exist simultaneously. In postmodernist discourse, there is no relevance for historical time, killed-according to Baudrillard (see Bogard, 1994, pp. 319, 329) by simulation, "in its journey into the digital void" (or perhaps seduced to death). Meanwhile, the present is simply a "mediascape saturated with simulacra of history" (Baudrillard, cited in Bogard, 1994, p. 313) . Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that the radical, divisive hyper-modern period of capitalism marks the absolute end of history (conceived, as we know it, as a linear space-time conception). It invented the private individual and productive bodies, now severed from a sense of tradition and the collective (social) body. In the period of late capitalism, social life has been effectively decoded, or deterritorialized, and everything regarded as sacred or traditional no longer seeming necessary. The conception of (historical) time then expresses no sequence; it is an arbitrary present moment (either now or never).
New social movements are able to capture the sentiments of the immediate present in an atemporal conception of being-in-the-world. Indeed, some new religious practices and organized movements are able to capture this "here and now" or Benjamin's Jetztzeit relevance, appearing almost counterlogical and ahistorical (see Taylor, 1999) . Although, in fact, these idiosyncratic movements do not deny history, they reappropriate it, invoking new imaginings of self and society. The choice often presented by interpreters of new religions in Thailand-as elsewhere-is to either celebrate new movements as forms of (Western) liberal plurality, or see them as essentially undermining traditional (conservative, civic) values.
The Spectacle of Thammakaai
Take, for instance, the modernist Thammakaai Movement (see Apinya, 1993; Suwanna, 1990; Taylor, 1990; Zehner, 1990) , which I would argue is a hyperrational, neoliberal consumerist response to normative (state) conservative/traditional Buddhism. 8 Thammakaai maintains an internal structure and spatial ordering that incorporates the global logico-morality of the postfordist marketplace and a simulated outcome of (late) modernist cultural and political identity. Thammakaai's monks move easily in a world of new global capitalism, consumption, and spectacle, reflect a transculturalized image. As spectacle, through social and cultural mechanisms Thammakaai produces specific illusions and pseudo-forms, abstracted and enticing for its followers that are linked to the domination of an institutionally controlled system of consumption (Debord, cited in Best, 1994, pp. 47-49) . The movement, founded in 1970 in metropolitan Bangkok, is a reflection of the wider social milieu; it is a religion of spectacle that is influenced by the cultural, economic, and political forces of globalization, although grounded in local visions. This contemporary expression of Thai Buddhism is an attempt to uproot (and decode) some predetermined traditional foundations, in the process producing and disseminating alternative spatial connections.
In the present informational period, the dominant social logic is formed by the "real virtuality" of the space of flows. Nevertheless, people reside in the material world, the "space of places" (Stalder, 1999, p. 7) . This implies a sense of (Lacanian) "schizophrenia" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) , a complexity emanating essentially from conditions created by the very nature of new capitalism. Here, two contrasting spatial and temporal logics confront each other. This, in turn, ensures a global destabilization of cultures in which individuals lose their sense of self or being and attempt through recoding to reclaim their identity in new forms.
In this destabilising and deterritorialized environment, certain social actors and marginal groups located at the social interstices-as in the case of the Thammakaai Movement-may (and frequently do) contest the inherent rationality or "logic" of these flows (Castells, 1996a, p. 33) . These interstices or marginal spaces create the ground for new connections to be made; they produce new social imaginings, situated between locales of normalizing power and distant (although not separated) from the repressive instrumentalities of the state and capital (see also Lefebvre, 1997, p. 73) . These margins or liminal interstices, the rhizomatic zones, generate the conditions for social and cultural creativity (as in new civil society organizations and specifically alternative religious practices), as we have seen so often in national histories, contesting power relations inherent in the existing social order.
Thammakaai, although representing certain endogenous middle-class consumer values, is translocal in its globalizing interlinked strategies of marketing and religion. The movement continually produces Other discourses from the interstices, which contest state religious ideology. It has the advantage, then, of being both inside and outside, integrating symbols of convention and tradition, while simultaneously opposing the status quo in terms that are distinctively universal. The movement, as a particularistic reaction to globalization processes, mediates and maintains an everimportant tension between local and global, blurring the margins and incorporating new "glocalised" (Robertson, 1992, p. 173) imaginings (see also Taylor, 2001, p. 142). 9 As Castells reminds us, the ensuing tension between the local and the global is the central dynamic of the Informational Age, where (postmodern) societies are increasingly oriented around the opposites Net (as Other) and the Self. The former represents new organizational formations based on use of networked communication media, whereas the latter symbolizing the reaffirmation of identities under conditions of change and instability. New social formations, such as new religious movements, emerge around primary unchanging identities contrasting with rapid change in the wider social order. It is the interplay of the individual and the network where the conditions of human life and experience around the world are so profoundly reshaped; and it is in the urban milieu (the Thai postmetropolis) where this recontextualization or reshaping is most noticeable.
In the new internationalized space of flows, importance is attached to an abstract space with interconnected electronic nodes or grids and virtual reality. This new digitalized space attempts to create an integrated total environment with linked interde-pendencies and, while undermining localism, simultaneously produces the conditions for hybridization. These homegrown hybrid cultural forms are often considered anarchic, posing a direct challenge to conventional (dominant) social logic and its universal value system (Robins, 1993, pp. 319, 325) .
Marking Out New Maps
At this point, I will now move on to a discussion of Thailand's real-and-imagined urban religioscapes, where, as Eco (cited in Soja, 2000, p. 325 ) noted more generally, the "logical distinction between Real World and Possible Worlds has been definitively undermined."
Not surprisingly in this interactive environment (in the smooth "nomadic-rhizomatic" cyber-zones), English and Thai language Buddhist Web sites are mushrooming. For instance, Watthai.net "provides free web hosting, email, computer technical support and training for Buddhist temples and websites." This new electronic religious landscape or "virtual Buddhism" has created "new frontiers" (Jones, 1995) of the religious imagination; it is a new domain, which, like virtual space generally, offers "order, refuge" and "withdrawal" (Robins, 1995, p. 152) . There are, of course, no physical places in cyberspace; "places" are software constructions that create environments for interaction. Although the modern day "cyber-flâneur" may stroll from place to place, he or she does not follow physical paths but rather logical links. Neil Smith (1984 Smith ( / 1990 referred to this space as "third (virtual) nature," an electronic space that has created an unlimited potential through simulated landscapes. The imagination is unlimited in electronic scapes. For instance, in new digital game technology, my son is able to create his own imaginative virtual soccer team, or "dream team," consisting of his chosen players from any world teams against computer-selected teams. In general, Cyberspaces are best understood as an-Other kind of nature's pluralization, one that is structured-as Lyotard noted (cited in Luke, 1999, p. 29)-on "bits rather than atoms."
It should not be forgotten that the movements and flows of (global) capital in the Thai postmetropolis are increasingly facilitated by the seemingly limitless (at least for some) outreach possibilities of cyberspace. Indeed, the reconstitution of capitalism in cyberspace is an ultimate kind of fantasy in that it exploits our own desires as the "inexhaustible material of consumption" and the "dream of infinite production" (Markley, 1996, p. 74) . Donna Haraway (1991, p. 65 ) also notes the implications for individual, state, and civic interests in microelectronics, and that this, in Baudrillard's terms (1994, p. 2) , forms "the technical basis of simulacra; that is, of copies without originals"; a simulation that is the basis of a (post-) modern urban condition.
In a metaphorical sense, a cartographer's map now engenders territory (place), rather than vice versa (the "precession of simulacra"; Baudrillard, 1994, p. 1) . It potentially undermines the very difference between the real and the imagined, the signifier and the signified, and true and false (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 2) . The complete disappearance of the real is anticipated when the "map covers the whole territory," leaving nothing to the imagination (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 123) . Although this is unrealistic given that there is always mental space, in Buddhist terms, mind-thought is a "desiring machine" to be mapped. Baudrillard (1994, pp. 6-7) would add also that when there is no longer a perceived real, there is a recourse to nostalgia, and at this point simulation takes hold.
If all of this seems to leave a sense of helplessness in the vast expanse of the unconscious, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) propose an alternative, this-worldly ethic, whereby resisting actors create their own "maps" so as to reflexively define and mark out new pathways of knowledge(s). Mapping "constructs the unconscious" in an orientation "toward an experimentation of contact with the real"; maps can exist by themselves without the need for anything outside of the map to exist. On the other hand, copies or tracings can only exist as representations; they display genetic characteristics in that they evolve and reproduce from earlier forms (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 12) . Tracings then imitate existing striated structures (or "all that comes under the energetic-spatio-temporal coordinates," as Deleuze remarks; see Stivale, 1985) . All codifications, including textual religions, are tracings, whereas maps are concerned with adaptation and experimentation, as we can see in the case of the territorializing of new urban religions and the networked systems. However, clearly Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 382-383) see sedentarized (monotheistic) religion as a "piece in the State apparatus" without considering nonlinear, counterhegemonic or "Othering" possibilities, as in a nomadic religion, which does not necessarily counterposition religion and nomadism.
In Thailand, alternative religious discourses (contesting official state-sanctioned religious "truth statements") seen as plotting new discursive and resistant pathways, marking out of new "maps," are clearly worrying for the state. In terms of material representations, "a map encodes space, which in turn can be decoded to disclose knowledge of the supposed real space" (Thongchai, 1994, p. 55) . New maps then are contested as they may reveal the potentiality of alternative knowledge(s) and create new counterspaces. In the May 1992 middle-class-led demonstrations in Bangkok, the prodemocracy leader Chamlong Srimuang's politico-religious sentiments and affiliations to the heterodox Santi Asok religious movement were represented as antistatist and counterideological by the military dominated state (see Taylor, 1993 Taylor, /1996 . The pro-democracy movement was also the start of a new civic society mentality, corresponding to the need for greater democracy and pluralism in the post-1997 constitutional reforms. In establishing a regime of truth for maintaining power, the military state needed to show then that alternative politico-religious discourses were threatening to state religion, and to the ordered tracings and regulated conceptions of nationhood (Taylor, 1993 (Taylor, /1996 .
In a similar way, the late Jit Poumisak's radical mapping of Thai history led to his murder by the state in 1966. The fateful Jit Poumisak wrote an innovative, although broadly conventional Marxist, interpretation of social and political history in 1957 (in a predemocratic period, which was certainly not a good time to be innovative) translated as The Real Face of Thai Feudalism Today (Reynolds, 1987) . This work, from the point of view of the state, was a nonhistory in not making copies or "tracings" (as in the official royal histories of Prince Damrong Rajanubhab). Here, the unit of analysis was the social formation in the Marxist sense with the monarchy linked to a regressive agrarian order. This, Reynolds (1987, pp. 11-13) says, was certainly seditious in challenging the established symbols of legitimacy (the unifying triad of king, nation, religion).
Difference, deregulation, and disorder can be dangerous for perduring local identities, as in the case of the threat from new mobile capitalism. Significantly, Haraway (1991, pp. 166-167) notes that the extreme mobility of capital (with the development of microelectronics) and the new international division of labor are intertwined with the rise of new collectivities, along with the weakening of familiar and local-based groupings. This feature of globalization (and postindustrial societies) is a primary concern over "place-based" interests, especially in regard to ethnicities (or cultural groups). As well, the flight of capital into cyberspace has made it less visible as the new global techno-elites move from centralized urban areas to dispersed reterritorialized spaces.
In maintaining its position of mobile power, Thammakaai horizontally infiltrated most of the normalizing apparatuses of Thai society, from civic to military, including education from schools to universities with the takeover of the influential Buddhist clubs. In the early 1980s, Thammakaai moved speedily into commercial centers including banking, finance, and stock market; the business world, housing/land development, and speculation; and segments of the military, bureaucracy, political parties, and the media. Importantly, finance moved around globally at the touch of a computer keyboard, disappearing and reappearing in various places.
The urban-based Thammakaai movement has been the first new religious organization to effectively utilize cyber-technology and the potential of mobile capital in the guise of its various (traditional) "merit making" schemes. 10 It is clear that cyberspace (in particular the Net), as part of wider social structures, is increasingly becoming contested and relevant to the political space in the new metropolis (Soja, 2000, p. 336) . It is also inherently anarchic and problematic for the state apparatuses unable to control the multicentered dispersions of (counter) ideas and practices (linked to the proliferation of civic society organizations), and a likely source of contemporary nomadic-rhizomatic thought. Thammakaai's ambitions are to work horizontally and rhizomatically on the interstices for the appropriation of normative religious space.
The rhizomatic nature of the Net as nonhierarchical, decentered power creates new problems for the state in that it cannot be destroyed, as it will simply reemerge again at any place at any time (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9) . Similarly in Thailand, for this very reason, radical religious movements at the interstices dispersed in alternative centers of power are similarly worrying.
The Net offers the ultimate form of resistance in its lines of flight, which constitute alternative means of escape from the forces of repression and stratification. Even the most intense strata consist of numerous lines of flight; for instance, territorialities "are shot through with lines of flight testifying to the presence within them of movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 55) . In this sense, lines of flight connect with new (social) formations. In the case of normalizing "arboric" systems, the root-tree does not construct or make connections in this way, whereas the rhizome-without a center, hierarchy, or signification-is constituted by an endless series of connections that may be defined by its boundless lines of flight. This may be the ultimate objective of the radical (individual or social movement) becoming rhizomatic.
The Brave New World of Digital Buddhism
There are an estimated more than 45,000 networks in cyberspace, with some 50 million mainframe and personal computers linked into these networks (Luke, 1999, p. 27) . There is a multiplicity of choices of entry to these networks, and the extent of the Internet itself forever changing and changeable. Indeed, the Net is ambient, nowhere in particular but everywhere at once. An individual does not "go to the Net"; they log in (online) from wherever their bodies are situated. Although the Net negates geometry or a spatially located subject, it therefore cannot be controlled from any direction.
Cyberspace (as Merleau-Ponty would no doubt argue) is sensed; it connects bodies interactively with the world around. Therefore, it is a perceived, conceptualized, and lived space. Indeed, it may be considered to be even a kind of landscape (in Lyotard's sense of where mind shifts from one sensible matter to another, retaining sensory organization appropriate to the first, or at least a memory of it). Those working with new digital technologies and in the landscape of cyberspace may create "scapes of place," an experience of moving outside of familiar and predictable boundaries. In time, digital living will mean less and less dependence on being in a specific place at a specific time, and even the transmission of "place" itself will start to become possible. For instance, a Buddhist Web site, named "Buddhanet," claims to bring an electronic "cyber-sangha" (discussed later) to spatially fragmented bodies, to any place and at any time. It is not dependent on place. Thai religion is changing to conform to new imaginings (or mental religio-scapes) of this abstracted space where Nibbana.com offers an antipodean ultimate hyperreality and "virtual" or "digital Dhamma" definitively here to stay.
As one Thai social commentator recently noted, the "Digital dhamma" trend may soon even "threaten the standing of monks as religious experts" (Sanitsuda, 2000) . In effect, lay Webmasters may become the new religious virtuosi (in Weber's sense), taking the place of monks as disseminators of information and knowledge (secular and sacred). As one Webmaster (Sanitsuda, 2000) says, "If monks don't adapt, they will soon lose their role in society." In relation to widespread criticism of the sangha, William Klausner (1999) comments that some "activists even urged a Buddhism without a clergy" (p. 86). A Thai Webmaster, who maintains his site from a remote village in Chainat Province, North West Thailand, said that through his Web site he is attempting to make Buddhism accessible and meaningful again for the contemporary world. However, there is no indication that a Net community will replace a monastic community, as "Dhamma Web sites . . . will never decrease the importance of monks as role models for Buddhists" (Sanitsuda, 2000) .
However, for most Thais, a religion without a monastic order (sangha) is unthinkable; similarly, a disembodied monastic order would be unthinkable. The Three Gems of Buddhism (Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha) are sustained and perpetuated through the corporate body of the Sangha. The Buddha, of course, is no longer alive, whereas the Dhamma requires the corpus of monks to act as interpreters, teachers, and representatives of the reclusive ideals (with the potential for spiritual liberation). However, given the recent media attention to miscreant monks (e.g., the case of now disrobed senior monks Phra Pativetviset and Phra Khruu Thammathronwanchai; see "Abbot Wore Special Forces Gear," 2000; Marshall, 2000; "Monkish Misconduct," 2000) , there are some serious issues that need to be addressed in regard to discipline (orthopraxy) and monastic supervision. Arguably, as an electronic space is not so liable to misrepresentation in the dispersion of digitized information, deviation (from the norm), mistakes, if they are made, are usually through human error in transmission. In the not-too-distant future, a "virtual" or "cyber-sangha" will be a dominant feature on the religious landscape; it will cease to represent anything but itself as simulacra of religion, a religion where pluralistic connections to patronage will be made through the Net rather than at the local monastery. This is clearly unthinkable to arborescent traditionalists who adhere to the sacrosanct ordered interiority of normative religion. Devotion, then, will be directed to a text-based digital space, generating a new medium of communicative religion.
The many sites now available to Thai Buddhist surfers consist of various virtual libraries, information about noted monks (living and deceased), information on Thai monasteries (national and international), commentary on controversial movements, and numerous Web boards.
In making connections to a cyber-sangha, new forms of cultural knowledge and experience imply disengagement with the material, political, and social realities of place (as in the local monastery and its centering of social hierarchies and the production of cultural norms). In this sense, hyperspace has created a confusion of time, distance, and the body, which have now been made meaningless (Rushkoff, 1994, p. 3) . These latent possibilities of reordering social space, in turn, have worked to create a new sense of utopia, a new imagining-in a context where the imagination has "become an organized field of social practices, a form of work . . . and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility" (Appadurai, 1996, p. 31) .
"DharmaNet," which claims to be the first and largest Buddhist Web site on the Net established in 1991 working out of Sonoma, California, offers an extensive "online Buddhist community." It is Then there is an Australian-based Web site named "Buddhanet," which describes itself as a "vision to link up with the growing world-wide culture of people committed to the Buddha's teachings and lifestyle." The Buddhanet also offers a unique "on-line cyber sangha" (monastic community). It went on to say that "in this way, an ancient tradition and the information superhighway will come together to create an electronic meeting place of shared concern and interests." In other words, an alternative disembodied (in the sense of a pure discursive/textual nature) social world that offers "online communion," where history is irrelevant, or at least "frozen," and where there are no social encounters (Robins, 1995, p. 150) . In a similar theological semantics of encounter, a Thammakaai Web site comments that We have moved from a mainframe or minicomputer-based universe to a very different and much more populous environment, one with hundreds of thousands of PCs scattered throughout Thailand, many linked up in networks to servers-and many of these frequently connected with a high-speed modem to the internet. (ITPC '98, 1998, p. 15) This is a long way from 1986, when a lecturer from the Asian Institute of Technology sent the first e-mail from Thailand with the assistance of servers in Tokyo and Melbourne, Australia (Thiravudh, 2001, p. 18) . All over Thailand, aside from religious connections mentioned above, from rural district towns to regional centers, Internet cafes are mushrooming and competing for space around tertiary education institutions, middle-class estates, and apartments. These provide a ready access to people of all social classes, from the not-so-well educated lonely hearts (seeking initial electronic liaisons and eventually, hopefully, permanent embodied relationships) to urban Western-educated "e-com" opportunists-even whole urban centers like the tourist town of Phuket in the south, with its planned new "digital paradise." Here, Thailand's National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (Nectec) intend turning Phuket into an IT haven with high-speed telecommunication infrastructure, a cyberport to house software firms, international education institutions, and electronic government (see "Database," 2000) . This ambitious reterritorializing project aims to attract international capital while at the same time integrate sanctioned local interests in a new concept of place-making.
The new modern "socially shaped" (Hine, 2000, p. 32 ) digital technology is decidedly antinature. It replaces nature, absorbs it, and then annihilates it. Simultaneously, it has taken on some of the characteristics of nature such as open spaces, communion, peace, integration, and totality. As electronic communication increases in general, new spaces, places, and social and cultural linkages are created within assemblages that break away from existing dominant codes (O'Connor & Ilcan, 2001, p. 3) . Computer networking in cyberspace through various online virtual functions creates "mediator" or intersectional functions, which connect digital technology and narrative expression "within the assemblage of 'rhizomatics'" (Stivale, 1998, p. 76) . This emergent assemblage situates alternative new religious movements such as Wat Phra Thammakaai in the matrix of a global religiopolitical electronic-based network (a new so-called [hyper-] Buddhist "Mecca" or "Vatican"; Thammakaai, quoted in Taylor, 1999, p. 173) . However, in an alternative sense, the Net's lack of spatiality and density and its ability to maintain distance between people would seem to work against the formation of meaningful and enduring religiopolitical solidarities (see Jones, 1997, p. 254) . As well, what may start out as resistant Internet use (smooth nomadic space) over time will become reterritorialized by the apparatuses of state and capital, such as the use of the Internet in the above-mentioned "Greater Phuket, Digital Paradise Project."
In urban Thailand, transformations through digitalization may be noted in many aspects of social life. The rapid economic growth and its related problems up to the mid-1990s created a heavy burden on the policy and administrative capacity of the highly centralized local administration system (Asian Development Bank Report, 1999, p. 25) . This led to decentralization of the administrative system under Article 78 of the new 1997 people's constitution and, embedded in the current national 5-year plan (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , the encouragement of civil society organizations. The Tambon (Sub-District) Administrative Organisations, or TAOs, were an attempt to decentralize politico-administrative power to the lowest levels (of subnational governments)-the villages and subdistricts (away from the centralized government apparatus in the shape of the Department of Local Administration with its formal hierarchy of appointed district-level chiefs).
11 A new initiative is the government's digitalization of the countryside linked to electronic rural urbanization (see Virilio, 1993, p. 72) to be undertaken directly through the provision of Internet access to all 7,200 TAOs nationwide. This is to connect semiliterate poor farmers and hitherto relatively isolated communities to the mass of information, such as in markets, through cyberspaceworld-city information networks. Under the 1997 Constitution, the state has the responsibility to ensure that the various electronic infrastructures are accessible to all, wherever they may be located ("Draft Law," 2000) .
The TAOs were essentially a state-initiated process (imposed in the reform conditions of multilateral donor organizations) of "opening up" a new microlevel political space. This allows for other possibilities to emerge, potentially driven by poor local farmers, although in reality local elites will continue in a different guise and moving into different roles to maintain control over knowledge-power. The implications for cyber-space here are far-reaching, although critics consider this just another of the government's pie-in-the-sky schemes and another means of state control, this time through the means of digital technologies. However, it is also clear that the Internet could be used against the interests of the state, that is, as essentially nomadic powerfor instance, in the transnational mobilization of resistant forces opposed to social and ecological controversies such as the construction of large-scale dams, minority human rights issues in the border regions, or women's rights groups in contentious issues such as the recently failed gender equality bill. In general, the Internet's potential use as a deterritorialized space, as creating the conditions for the emergence of new kinds of civil society organizations, and in transforming spatial arrangements, is seemingly unlimited.
Conclusion
In this article, I have indicated some of the third-space possibilities of the Internet/ Intranet and some of the ways in which digitalized electronics are transforming religious space in Thailand. It is, after all, only a beginning. The future may be here already in the dissolution of time and the privileging of space, while human communities are left only with nostalgia and a simulated world where original, first-order things cease to exist. But, thus said, the social and cultural transformative potential of new electronic space and virtual associations is only just being realized, with a dispersion of electronic religious networks that are clearly here to stay.
Notes

